Reciprocity in Organisations by Englmaier, Florian et al.
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt · Department of Economics · University of Munich · D-80539 Munich, 






















*/** University of Munich 
















Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Discussion Paper No. 504 
 
 
Reciprocity in Organisations 
Evidence from the UK 
 
 




Evidence from the UK∗
Florian Englmaier Thomas Kolaska Stephen Leider †
March 17, 2015
Recent laboratory evidence suggests that personality traits, in particular
social preferences, may affect contractual outcomes under moral hazard.
Using the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 we find
that behaviour of employers and employees is consistent with the presence of
gift-exchange motives: firms that screen applicants for personality are less
likely to pay low wages and more likely to provide (non-pecuniary) benefits.
Firms likewise benefit from employee screening as they can implement more
team-working and are generally more successful. Other human resource
management practices only poorly predict these patterns. Moreover, there
is no association between dismissals and personality tests, indicating that
personality tests do not merely improve the fit between applicant and em-
ployer. Hence, we conclude that motivation based on gift-exchange motives
is a plausible explanation for our results.
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1. Introduction
Understanding the behaviour of employees in labour relations is crucial for managers
and firm owners who aim to align potentially diverging interests of management and
workforce. In the last decades contract theorists developed a consistent framework in
which monetary incentives induce agents to exert effort, serving as a guideline for real-
world firms.1 While human resource departments (to some extent) rely on theoretical
considerations, the majority of real-world labour contracts are characterised by fixed
payments and – if at all – only a minor part of employees’ income is attributed to
incentive pay.2 The prevalence of weak (monetary) incentives in real world contracts,
while apparently still obtaining nontrivial effort, is not well explained by the standard
approach in contract theory which emphasizes the use of output realizations as a (noisy)
measure of employee effort to overcome the moral hazard problem.3
Incorporating concepts from behavioural economics may provide additional expla-
nations for these real-world observations. In an early contribution, Akerlof (1982)
demonstrates that wages may exceed the market-clearing wage when employers at-
tempt to influence working norms via gift-exchange.4 More recently, Englmaier and
Leider (2012) introduce the concept of reciprocity – i.e. gift-exchange motivation – into
the classical principal-agent framework concluding that firms with reciprocal employees
have more leeway to cost-efficiently induce effort: shifting away from direct monetary
incentives and inducing employees to behave reciprocally towards their employers al-
lows firms to save high costs from risk premia they would have to pay when using
high-powered incentives. Relying on reciprocity, however, requires firms to screen for
employees with reciprocal traits.
In this paper we use Englmaier and Leider (2012) as a theoretical guideline and
provide evidence for the use of reciprocity based motivation in organisations. Using
the 5th wave of the “Workplace Employment Relations Survey” (WERS 2004) a large
scale survey of UK-based firms, we find evidence for firm behaviour consistent with
gift-exchange motivations. We interpret the use of compulsory personality tests for job
candidates as an indicator whether firms explicitly screen applicants for personality
1See Prendergast (1999) for a survey.
2Lemieux et al. (2009) estimate that approximately 37% of male labour market participants in the
US (using the PSID, Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976 - 1998) receive variable payments with
a median magnitude of 3.5%. Englmaier and Leider (2012) discuss further studies corroborating
this argument.
3Note that models that emphasize multitasking in work tasks, following Holmström and Milgrom
(1991), have been one explanation why we empirically observe rather muted explicit incentives.
The use of career incentives is another potential explanation for the empirical observation; see,
e.g. Lazear (1979) or Levin (2003).
4Also in a labour market context, Becker et al. (2013) provide field evidence for heterogeneous
long-term responses to gift-exchange motivation.
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traits that may be correlated with job candidates’ inclination towards reciprocity. In
line with gift-exchange motives, these firms are less likely to pay their employees par-
ticularly low wages and other non-pecuniary benefits like employer pension schemes
and extended paid annual leave. Furthermore, employees in these establishments enjoy
more on-the-job training (c.f. Leuven et al. (2005)) and have a higher chance that their
employer provides guaranteed job security.
Screening applicants’ personality and providing benefits for those who get hired
may pay off for the firm if employees reciprocate with higher effort. Even though
we are not able to measure effort directly, we find that employers using personality
tests report higher levels of firm performance and are more likely to organise work in
teams. The latter is particularly interesting as team work is a key modern human
resource management (HRM) practices and is considered to increase productivity by
reaping synergies; see Barton et al. (2003). If firms benefit from team-working under
the condition of non-shirking and it is harder to measure effort of each team member
compared to individual production (as the employer may only observe team output)
then the implementation of team structures should be more likely in organisations with
more reciprocal employees. Note, that the assumption is not that “firms benefit from
teamwork under the condition of non-shirking”, but that (some) firms may benefit from
the implementation of teamwork, and that it is more likely that the implementation of
teamwork is beneficial when workers are reciprocal.
In contrast, two additional measures for the presence of somewhat sophisticated
HRM practises within a firm – competency tests for job candidates and variable pay-
ments for employees – fare much worse in predicting benefits for employer or employees.
This implies that only screening for personality as opposed to the use of competency
tests or other HRM practises explains patterns consistent with gift-exchange motives.
The lack of an association between personality tests and dismissals within an estab-
lishment furthermore indicates that personality tests do not merely increase the “fit”
between employer and employee, which otherwise might have caused similar relation-
ships between screening and benefits. Moreover, including competency tests for job
candidates and variable payments for employees in the analysis also serves as control
such that we do not merely pick up the general sophistication of a firm’s HRM practices
in our regressions.
Closest to this work is Huang and Cappelli (2010). Based on a national survey of US
employers, they argue that employers who state that they particularly value applicants
with high “work ethic” are less prone to monitor their employees, organise more work
in teams, and have lower turnover rates. Furthermore, employees in firms looking
for motivated employees receive higher wages and these firms are more productive.
Comparing their results with ours we can, by and large, confirm their findings, with the
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exception that we do not find any relationship between personality tests and turnover
and monitoring respectively.5
While we regard our study as complementary to Huang and Cappelli (2010), we are
distinct in at least two main dimensions: First, the richness of the WERS allows us to
include the entire range of occupational groups within an establishment, from managers
to unskilled labour, into large parts of our analysis. In contrast Huang and Cappelli
(2010) use data on frontline workers only.6 Second, Huang and Cappelli (2010) use
a survey question in which managers have to rate how important candidates’ “work
ethic” is for them when assessing applicants. In contrast, we use “hard” information
on whether written personality tests are used in the hiring process. These tests are
based on observable practises, implying that other datasets may contain this measure
as well which ensures that the analysis is transferable to other data sources containing
information on test use. Using personality tests as a measure for reciprocity within
the labour force, the difference in the interpretation of the results between Huang and
Cappelli (2010) and our work becomes clear: we favour – based on a fully fledged agency
model in Englmaier and Leider (2012) – the mechanism of reciprocity as conditional
intrinsic motivation as a plausible explanation of our observations, whereas “work ethic”
refers to unconditional motivation of the employee.
However, both studies have in common that the cross-sectional structure of the data
does not allow to pin down a unique explanation of the observed pattern. Despite evi-
dence in favour of reciprocity as the underlying principle we cannot establish causality
and we consider the additional evidence in favour of reciprocity as still only of sugges-
tive nature.
Personality tests are only one potential dimension of how firms screen job candi-
dates.7 Other popular methods are interviews, reference letters and – widely used –
competency tests.8 Whereas the latter aim to uncover cognitive ability, personality
tests – the Big Five framework is a prominent example – measure a whole range of
characteristics of a potential employee. In particular we interpret the use of these
personality tests as a proxy for firms that are more likely to have (highly) reciprocal
workers. In many cases this may be due to screening for other desirable traits that are
correlated with reciprocity, though firms may be also directly screening for reciprocally
5Institutional differences like unionisation rates (in the US 12 - 13 percent and in the UK about
29 percent in 2002/2003 (Lesch (2004) and Visser (2006)) between the United States and Britain
however do not allow for direct comparisons of the results.
6Within the WERS dataset we are unable to restrict our estimations to frontline workers because
the majority of the dependent variables in question is available only on firm level or for the largest
occupational group.
7Wilk and Cappelli (2003) show that employers differ substantially in the way and the extent to
which they make use of applicant screening.




Our empirical approach is consistent with findings that document that personality
traits usually identified with personality tests within the Big Five framework are cor-
related with economic preference measures, in particular measures of reciprocity as
commonly defined in laboratory experiments. Ashton et al. (1998) conclude on basis
of hypothetical questions that high “agreeableness” and high “emotional stability” are
associated with high reciprocal altruism. Borghans et al. (2008) provide an exten-
sive review of psychology personality traits and their relation to economic concepts.
However, they cannot provide evidence on the relationship of social preferences and
personality because there had been no studies examining the direct link prior to their
study. Dohmen et al. (2008) study the link between personality, reciprocity, trust, and
socio-demographic characteristics in the SOEP and find significant positive correlations
between measures of positive reciprocity and Big Five traits, in particular conscien-
tiousness and agreeableness, and negative correlations between measures of negative
reciprocity and in particular agreeableness. Becker et al. (2012) directly study the
link between psychological personality measures and economic preferences using both
lab and survey data. Their results corroborate the findings in Dohmen et al. (2008).
Ben-Ner et al. (2004) conduct a dictator game experiment in which recipients in an
initial game become dictators in a second game. They show that – when the subjects
remain within their pair – the amount sent back is strongly correlated with the amount
received, a typical example of reciprocal behavior. They find that Big Five indicators
“agreeableness” and “openness” are positively associated with the degree of reciprocal
transfers; i.e., more agreeable or open individuals react more strongly to the dictator’s
decision in the initial game. Cognitive ability seems not to influence the propensity to
reciprocate. Englmaier and Leider (2010) conduct a real-effort gift-exchange experi-
ment in the laboratory and show that the Big Five indicator “agreeableness” positively
predicts the extent of the effort response to a wage-gift. To sum up, also there are only
few studies on this specific topic, the results indicate a positive relationship between
psychological personality measures and positive reciprocity.
The psychological literature has collected substantial evidence that personality tests
produce useful information to firms. In a seminal paper, Schmidt and Hunter (1998)
conduct a meta-analysis on the predictive validity of different personnel selection cri-
teria on future job performance of individuals to document that cognitive ability and
“sample work” are the most important predictor of job performance, but personality
measures also have high predictive validity. In the 1990s a number of studies and
meta-analyses on the predictive validity of – in particular – the Big Five for future
job performance have been conducted. Barrick et al. (2001) review the state of the
literature on the relationship between personality and performance by conducting a
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meta-analysis on meta-analyses and find a strong general relationship between consci-
entiousness and performance and more heterogeneous relationships between other Big
Five dimensions and different criteria for performance (which depend – perhaps not
surprisingly – on job characteristics, the sector, etc.).
In an economics study, Autor and Scarborough (2008) document the hiring pro-
cedures of a large retail firm – which according to the authors is representative for
the industry – that uses personality tests to screen workers upon hiring. The firm
gave hiring preference to applicants with positive z-scores for “agreeableness”, “consci-
entiousness”, and “extroversion”, Big Five traits that are predictive for the presence of
reciprocity. Hence, the hiring method applied in this firm ceteris paribus should lead
also to an above average reciprocal workforce.
The importance of social preferences for individual decisions has been documented in
various studies; for an extensive survey see Fehr and Schmidt (2003), for field evidence
DellaVigna (2009), and Fehr and Gächter (2000) in their survey explicitly concentrate
on the prevalence of reciprocity. In several theoretical contributions, social preferences
have been associated to optimal contract designs, suggesting that not only productivity
and ability but also social traits can influence the generosity of contract offers.9 In an
empirical study using survey data, Dohmen et al. (2009) provide evidence from real-
world labour markets for the importance of reciprocity on wages and effort provision.
Englmaier et al. (2014) in a real-effort laboratory experiment elicit both productivity
and social preferences from agents and find that principals increase wages for both
traits by adapting contract offers accordingly. In an earlier contribution, Cabrales et al.
(2010) predict outcomes in a gift-exchange experiment on basis of elicited behavioural
preferences.
Another strand of the personnel literature explores synergies between different HRM
practises. Using firm data from steel finishing lines, Ichniowski et al. (1997) find that
the use of HRM practises – like incentive payments, work being organised in teams,
flexible job assignment, job security, and training for employees – is positively asso-
ciated with productivity of these firms. In a recent lab-experimental study Bartling
et al. (2012) find complementarities between high discretion, high wages and rent shar-
ing, job characteristics which are commonly associated with “good jobs”. The authors
demonstrate that these jobs emerge endogenously (as they are profitable) if employ-
ers have the opportunity to screen job candidates. Importantly, they show that it is
screening for social preferences and not for competency which is necessary for “good
jobs” to emerge.
We contribute to the literature by combining evidence from both strands of the lit-
erature. We show that screening applicants for personality is associated with a bundle
9See for references Itoh (2004), Dur and Glazer (2008) or Englmaier and Wambach (2010)
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of benefits for employees and employers. In contrast, firms’ use of competency tests
fails to predict these outcomes. Moreover, personality tests are unrelated to dismissals
within firms. Hence, explanations solely targeting on correlations between successful
firms and application of modern management and HRM practises, e.g., Bloom and
VanReenen (2007), Ichniowski et al. (1997), cannot explain the whole set of observa-
tions and we feel confident that our results point to an additional explanatory role for
a more nuanced, behavioural, interpretation of the observed patterns: The systematic
use of reciprocity based motivation by firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide an
extensive description of the WERS 2004 with a special focus on personality tests.
Section 3 contains details on the hypotheses, the estimation strategy, and results.
Furthermore a substantial part of the section is dedicated to robustness checks. Section
4 concludes with a discussion. An Appendix and an Online Appendix collect tables for
robustness analysis.
2. Data
2.1. The WERS 2004 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies on the 2004 “Workplace Employee Relations Survey”
(WERS 2004), the fifth in a government-funded series of surveys carried out at British
workplaces.10 The WERS 2004 covers information on employment relations of British
workplaces and is provided by employees and employers. The following analysis en-
tirely relies on the information about establishments provided by employers.11 This
dataset is weighted using standard weights to account for the sampling design and is
stratified according to the suggested procedure which is a combination of number of
employees and industry code.12
The WERS 2004, consisting of 2,295 establishments surveyed, is a representative
sample of the British economy.13 The number of employees per establishment varies
10For further information on the WERS see: http://www.wers2004.info.
11The WERS consists of different datasets with varying respondents. Besides the survey answered
by employers, the WERS also comprises datasets on employees and employee representatives with
questions targeted to figure out their individual view on the establishment and their working
conditions. The latter two datasets are not employed for our analysis because they do not contain
structured information that would aid our strategy. Moreover, we lack information on the selection
process of a workplace’s employees for this survey part implying potential endogeneity problems.
12For reference, see http://www.wers2004.info/FAQ.php#stata, section 5.6 “How do I apply weights
and correctly estimate variances in Stata?”, April 23, 2014.
13“WERS 2004 (...) provide(s) a nationally representative account of the state
of employment relations and working life inside British workplaces.” Source:
http://www.wers2004.info/wers2004/wers2004.php, October 23rd 2012.
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widely between a minimum of 5 jobs per workplace up to 10,006 with an average of
414 jobs per workplace. Note, however, that the mean is inflated by few extremely
large companies – the median firm size is 69 jobs and even the 99th percentile only
contains a maximum of 4,936 jobs per workplace. The firms cover almost all branches
of the economy with a slight concentration on health, whole trade and manufacturing.14
About one fourth of the establishments are attributed to the public sector. More than
half of the establishments are unionised (58 percent).
21 percent of the establishments are part of the manufacturing sector, three quarters
are one of a number of different workplaces in the United Kingdom belonging to the
same organisation, 23 percent are a single independent establishment and 2 percent
are the sole UK establishment of a foreign company. Overall 78 percent of the firms
are either entirely or predominantly UK-owned, whereas the controlling head office of
the company is foreign-based in only 12 percent of the cases. Market shares are widely
dispersed with approximately 39 percent (15 percent) of the firms indicating a market
share of less than five percent (more than 50 percent). Roughly in line with this, about
75 percent of the firms report that the perceived degree of competition in their market
is either high or very high whereas 11 percent state it to be low or very low.15
Within each firm the WERS 2004 distinguishes between 9 different occupational
groups.16 Panel (d) of Figure 1 provides absolute frequencies for all nine occupational
groups pooling all 2,295 establishments. Not surprisingly, almost all firms state to have
a management department and about 80 percent of the surveyed firms have employees
in secretarial or administrative positions. As several variables of interest, including
HRM practises, are provided on occupational group level, our subsequent analysis
relies on both, firm level and occupational group level.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for variables of interest, including the following
statistics: the number of observations, averages and standard deviations, the 25th,
50th and 75th percentile as well as minimum and maximum values. The first set of
variables is reported on firm level.
“Monitoring” is an ordinal variable asking for the proportion of non-managerial em-
ployees who have job duties which involve supervising other employees. Value one indi-
14Workplaces are classified according to the SIC 2003 (Standard Industrial Classification) by the
UK National Statistics. Sectors not covered by the WERS 2004 include: Agriculture, hunting
and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-
territorial bodies.
15The fractions of the legal state, market share and the degree of competition are calculated dropping
any unclear answers.
16These occupational groups are: (1) Managers and senior officials, (2) professional occupations, (3)
associate professionals and technical occupations, (4) administrative and secretarial occupations,
(5) skilled trade occupations, (6) caring, leisure and other personal services, (7) sales and customer
service occupations, (8) process, plant, and machines operatives, and drivers, and (9) routine and
unskilled occupations.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Pctl.
Obs. Avg. SD 25 50 75 Min. Max.
Firm Level
Monitoring 2278 2.52 1.08 2 2 3 1 7
Dismissal 2160 0.02 0.05 0 0 0.01 0 1.3
Firm Performance 2160 0.54 0.5 0 1 1 0 1
Job Security 2295 0.17 0.37 0 0 0 0 1
Low Wage 2135 0.03 0.13 0 0 0 0 1
Personality Tests 2292 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 0 1
Competency Tests 2291 0.61 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Incentive Pay 2295 0.57 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Largest Occupational Group
Possibly Non-Pecuniary Benefits
Any Benefit 2286 0.89 0.31 1 1 1 0 1
No. Benefis 2286 2.6 1.36 2 3 3 0 5
Pension Scheme 2286 0.77 0.42 1 1 1 0 1
Company Car 2286 0.18 0.38 0 0 0 0 1
Private Health 2286 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
Extended Paid Leave 2286 0.75 0.43 1 1 1 0 1
Sick Pay 2286 0.70 0.46 0 1 1 0 1
On-the-Job Training 1950 4.05 1.09 3 4 5 1 6
General Training 2288 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Team-working 2279 5.08 2.25 3 6 7 1 7
Notes: Statistics for each variable are calculated omitting “refusal”, “don’t know” and “not applicable”,
indicating unclear answers. “Job Security”, “Personality Tests”, “Competency Tests” and “Incentive
Payments” are collapsed on firm level to guarantee comparability. The lower panel refers to
information on the largest occupational group only. “Monitoring”, “On-the-job Training”, and
“Team-working” are ordinal variables with lower values corresponding to lower levels of monitoring,
training, and team-working respectively. “Dismissal” and “Low Wage” are continuous fraction of
dismissed employees, and employees with low earnings. “No. Benefits” counts the number of granted
benefits, the remaining variables are binary.
cates that no employee has monitoring tasks – on average firms indicate that between
one and 19 percent of the workers have monitoring tasks. The continuous variable (rel-
ative) “Dismissal” measures the percentage of the workforce which has been dismissed
within the previous year. The data suggest that dismissals occur very rarely.
“Firm Performance” is an indicator which combines the following self-reported perfor-
mance measures: “Financial Performance”, “Labour Productivity” and “Product Qual-
ity”. The indicator is one, if firms in at least one of the three dimensions report to
have better performance than the median answer of all firms for each dimension.17
17For these three measures employers were asked to rate the performance of their firm compared to
the relevant industry, resulting in heavily over-rated own performance: for the example of “Labour
Productivity”, 49 percent of employers state to be better or a lot better than the average and
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This classification based on self-reporting, splits the data into two almost equal parts
of rather successful and unsuccessful establishments.
The data contain rich information on various aspects of the workers’ compensation
and benefit package. “Job Security” is reported for each occupational group.18 In this
table, however, we collapse the measure on firm level. Hence the dummy variable on
“Job Security” is one if at least in one occupational group within an establishment
employees enjoy job security or non-compulsory redundancies.19 Finally, “Low Wage”
measures the fraction of low-wage earners compared to all employees within a firm.
The WERS defines the lowest wage category as wages equal 4.5 pounds per hour or
below. The dataset provides three more wage categories: 4.51 – 5, 5.01 – 15 or 15 and
above pounds per hour.
For the second set of variables the dataset provides measures for the largest occupa-
tional group in terms of employees. Possibly non-pecuniary benefits for the employee
comprise different measures of benefits for a worker. “Any Benefit” is a binary vari-
able indicating whether employees of the largest occupational group receive any of five
benefits suggested in WERS 2004, with almost 90 percent of firms providing at least
one benefit. “Number of Benefits” is an ordinal measure how many (between zero and
five) different benefits of the suggested five benefits employees receive. We furthermore
provide summary statistics for all in the survey suggested benefits, namely “Pension
Scheme”, “Company Car”, “Private Health Insurance”, “Extended Paid Leave” and “Sick
Pay”.
The variable “On-the-Job Training” is measured ordinally with value one indicating
that employees of the largest occupational group did not experience any training within
the previous year and six implying ten days and more. The WERS 2004 furthermore
distinguishes between providing training on computing skills, team-working, communi-
cation skills, leadership skills, operation of new equipment, customer service, health and
safety, problem-solving methods, equal opportunities, reliability and working to dead-
lines and quality control procedures. We classify team-working skills, communication
skills, and leadership skills under the label “General Training” as these cover matters
which are not narrowly job-specific but may be considered as more general and hence
94 percent state to be at least about average for the industry. Overrating is similarly severe for
variables “Financial Performance” and “Product Quality”. To account for this overrating we classify
establishments as successful if their own rating is better than the median rating of all firms.
18 The explanation in the WERS handbook states: “Is there a policy of guaranteed job security or
no-compulsory redundancies for any of these groups at this workplace?” In the UK, as opposed
to many continental European countries, employment is in general less protected and closer to
the employment-at-will model practiced in the US. Workplaces offering “job security” in general
abstain from terminating an employee’s contract for other than disciplinary reasons or in the case
of a company undergoing restructuring.
19Non-compulsory redundancies cover voluntary redundancies and early retirement, see
https://www.gov.uk/staff-redundant/noncompulsory-redundancy, November 20, 2012.
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can be beneficial for an employee’s entire working life across different employers.20
Finally “Team-working” is an ordinal variable asking for the proportion of employees
in the largest occupational group being designated to teams. No team-working at all
(value one) is rather rare, and an average of almost three indicates that 60 – 80 percent
of largest occupational group employees work in teams.
2.2. HRM Practises
The WERS 2004 provides detailed information about HRM practises within estab-
lishments including the prevalence of personality tests, competency tests and variable
payments by occupational group. In order to be able to control for the fact that some
workplaces might have an in general more sophisticated HR department we classify es-
tablishments that use these three practices as employing somewhat sophisticated HRM
practises.
More than one third of all establishments use personality tests when screening job
candidates whereas more than 60 percent of firms make use of competency tests in at
least one occupational group (see Table 1).21 Both personality tests and competency
tests are less prevalent in sectors with lower skill intensive tasks (i.e. construction,
wholesale and retail, and hotels and restaurants) while we find high rates of competency
tests in financial services, public administration and education.22 Similarly, personality
tests are prominent in financial services, public administration and manufacturing. A
correlation coefficient of ρ = 0.02 (ρ = 0.05) between self-rated perceived degree of
competition and personality (competency) tests provides little evidence for supportive
effects of market pressure on the introduction of HRM practises.
Analysing the prevalence of both screening tests within the firm it is no surprise that
screening devices are most common for hiring managers. Excluding managers, in about
24 percent (56 percent) of establishments personality (competency) tests are required
at least in one occupational group when recruiting new employees.
The prevalence of personality and competency tests by occupational group is sum-
marised in detail in panel (a) and (b) in Figure 1. Comparing both panels it again
becomes clear that employers use competency tests more often when hiring applicants:
for each occupational group the relative frequency of competency tests exceeds that of
personality tests. More interestingly, the distributions of both tests differ to a large
extent. Whereas firms make use of competency tests to a similar extent across occu-
20We present in Appendix B robustness checks on the definition of “General Training”.
21The WERS handbook states that competency tests “target practical skills needed to perform the
job, for example, a mechanic may be asked to dismantle and reconstruct a car engine.”
22One notable exception of lower skill intensive tasks and very high rates of both tests is the sector
“electricity, gas and water” as classified by the UK National Statistics. However this may not be
representative due to small sample size of only 45 observations for this sector.
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Figure 1: Relative Frequency of HRM Practises by Occupational Group
This figure provides an overview over the prevalence of personality tests, competency tests
(upper row) and incentive pay for nine different occupational groups (bottom left). The
picture on the bottom right depicts the prevalence of each of the nine occupational groups in
absolute terms.
(a) Personality Tests (b) Competency Tests
(c) Incentive Pay (d) Occupational Group
pational groups (with exceptions of personal services and unskilled labour with clearly
lower rates) the prevalence of personality tests starkly declines with decreasing skill
intensity. The exception is the group of sales employees who are very likely to be
screened for personality upon hiring.
A comparison of both distributions provides some tentative evidence that personality
tests and competency tests are measuring different characteristics of the job candidate
and are applied to different job requirements. This assessment is further supported
by a correlation coefficient of only ρ = 0.24 between personality tests and competency
tests implying no strict path dependency in firms’ choice of which screening devices to
apply.23 Of all firms, 38 percent only screen for competency and 5.5 percent exclusively
screen for personality upon hiring, whereas 39 percent apply both devices.24
23This measure correlates personality tests and competency tests both for all occupational groups
excluding managers.
24Including managers shifts these fractions a bit: 38 percent of firms use exclusively competency tests,
7 percent personality tests and 39 percent both tests.
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The third measure for advanced HRM practises are incentive components in employ-
ees’ compensation schemes. Paying some sort of variable payment – either performance
pay or profit pay – is common in 57 percent of establishments (and in half of the firms
in at least one occupational group if abstracting from the group of managers).25 As can
be seen from panel (c) in Figure 1 the distribution of incentive pay across occupational
groups declines for less skill intensive tasks with the exception of sales, where incentive
pay is common.
3. Reciprocity in Organisations
In this Section we use the presence of personality tests in a firms’ hiring procedure
as a proxy for this firm having a weakly more reciprocally inclined workforce. Even
if a firm does not use personality tests to directly screen for reciprocal workers, it
might end up with a more reciprocal workforce as a by-product (see the discussion
in the Introduction). This allows us to test various hypotheses regarding reciprocity
in organisations within one data set. Some of these hypotheses have independently
been advanced in Leuven et al. (2005), Huang and Cappelli (2010), and Englmaier and
Leider (2012).
3.1. Hypotheses
The model in Englmaier and Leider (2012) serves as a loose theoretical background for
developing the following hypotheses. In this model employers can employ incentives
based on gift-exchange if two conditions are fulfilled: First, in a labour market with
heterogeneous agents, the employer has to screen for reciprocal job candidates, willing
to repay a generous contract offer with increased effort. Second, the willingness of these
reciprocally inclined employees to reciprocate needs to be “activated” by the employer
via initial “kind behaviour”. More technically, the employer has to offer a contract
that exceeds the agent’s outside option. This can be achieved by offering a higher
than market wage26 or, as the model is based on utility arguments, by providing other,
possibly non-pecuniary, benefits, like an employer pension scheme or paid annual leave.
According to Leuven et al. (2005), firms with a more reciprocal workforce are more
likely to provide training to their employees. Besides regarding training as additional
benefit for workers, reciprocal behaviour of the agent might be a necessary condition for
25The dataset only indicates whether a firm provides variable pay for a certain occupational group
but does not give estimates of its magnitude compared to the fixed wage.
26A different explanation of high wages is provided by Huang and Cappelli (2010): As workers with
high work ethic help the firm to save costs, employers attempt to hire as many of these types as
possible, which drives up their wages (rent sharing).
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the provision of on-the-job training. As benefits from training are inherently sequential,
the employer has to trust her employee that the employee does not enjoy the training
and then leaves for a better offer. Put differently, training could be regarded as an
increase in the worker’s outside option. Furthermore if the employer is convinced of
the worker’s reciprocal behaviour, she may be willing to provide relatively more general
training, which is advantageous not only for a specific job but for the worker’s entire
employment biography.
In a similar vein, employers may provide job security to their labour force, signalling
confidence in workers’ loyalty towards the firm. If agents, however, lack reciprocal
attachment to the establishment, job security schemes enable employees to exploit this
device via shirking while being protected against immediate consequences.
Hypothesis 1 (Generosity to Workers) Firms which screen for personality pay
higher wages, are more likely to provide their workforce additional (potentially non-
pecuniary) benefits, should have a higher likelihood to provide their workers higher
amounts of on-the-job training, in particular more general training, and should be more
inclined to provide job security to their employees.
On the other hand, making use of motivational devices which are based on reciprocal
behaviour is costly for firms in the first place, as most gifts like job security or pension
systems involve direct costs. Job security, for instance, inhibits employers to adjust the
size of the labour force to fluctuations in demand in the short run. Hence, a rational
employer using reciprocal motivation should expect to enjoy some benefits which at
least offset these investments. Though the data does not allow us to pin down the
cost-efficiency of a firm’s behaviour, we proceed in our analysis by providing some
illustrative correlations.
Screening job candidates for their personality may be associated with employers’
inclination to organise tasks in teams. If firms benefit from team-working under the
condition of non-shirking and it is harder to measure effort of each team member
compared to individual production (as the employer may only observe team output)
then the implementation of team structures should be more likely in organisations with
more reciprocal employees. Hence we regard the option for firms to use team-working
if necessary as a benefit which can (more easily) be achieved with reciprocal workers.
This leads us to the hypothesis that organisations with compulsory personality tests
and team-working of employees should be complements.
The strongest link between reciprocity and benefits for the firm are the correlations
of firm performance and screening job candidates for personality. Such relationships
could imply that firms relying on reciprocity as a means of motivating workers on
average are more successful in the market.
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Huang and Cappelli (2010) document correlations between “work ethic”, monitor-
ing, and turnover, respectively. First, they argue that screening for “work ethic” and
monitoring should be substitutes as employees with high “work ethic” exert effort vol-
untarily. Second, turnover decreases because the fit between job candidate and the
firm should be better – a classical matching argument. For completeness, we include
these two claims into the set of our testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 (Value to Firms) Firms which screen for personality should have more
leeway to organise tasks in teams and should perform better in the market.
3.2. Methods
To study the correlations between reciprocity and different outcome variables we use
personality tests upon hiring as a measure for reciprocity. The general specification of
our estimations is the following reduced form model:





where yid is the outcome of the dependent variable in occupational group d of firm i.
The subscripts of Pid, an indicator for the use of personality tests, are defined accord-
ingly.27 Iid are indicators, which are (for each establishment) available on occupational
group level. Xi are (firm-wide) firm fixed controls and εid is an error term, which is
assumed to be i.i.d. across firms but may be arbitrarily correlated within firms (be-
tween occupational groups). These potential within-firm correlations are accounted by
clustering at the firm-level.
Estimations differ in two main dimensions: First, we distinguish whether the depen-
dent variable is reported at the firm-level or separately for each occupational group.
The latter allows for matching between HRM practises and dependent variables on oc-
cupational group level. Second, different yid are scaled differently, suggesting to adapt
estimation strategies accordingly.
Job security – as defined in Footnote 19 – is the only outcome variable which is
provided for each occupational group; hence we estimate the effect of personality tests
on job security pooling all available occupational groups.28 This implies that we are able
27In the main specification we present results where the indicator variable equals 1 if the firm uses
personality tests in any occupational group. We re-run our analysis assigning value 1 for the
personality test indicator only if the largest occupational group within a firm is screened using
personality tests. All our results still hold under this specification. Results for this alternative
specification are documented in Appendix E in Table E-15.
28For this estimation we use all occupational groups per firm and create an indicator, whether the
firm provides job security for employees in the respective occupational group. As differently sized
firms may have more of less occupational groups (and hence giving firms with more groups a
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to match the provision of job security for each occupational group with the employed
set of HRM practises.
The next set of dependent variables only contains information on the largest occu-
pational group within an establishment. This set consists of all non-pecuniary benefits
for the employee, including “Pension Scheme” and “Extended Leave”, the “No. Ben-
efits” as well as its prevalence (“Any Benefits”). Furthermore it comprises “On-the-
Job Training”, “General Training” and “Team-working”. We adapt the model accord-
ingly and replace the dependent variable with the outcome for the largest group y
id̃i
,
d̃i = max(# of employees(di)) ∀i and d ∈ {professionals, ..., unskilled occupations}.




. Firm fixed controls which
are summarised in Xi are unaffected.
For the remainder of the dependent variables, i.e. “Dismissal”, “Monitoring”, “Low
Wage”, and “Firm Performance”, the dataset only provides information at the firm
level and lacks individualised occupational group specific data. Hence we construct
aggregate measures from the occupational specific measure of personality tests, defining
indicator Pi being one if in at least one occupational group (excluding managers and
senior officials) job candidates are screened via personality tests.29 Analogously to
personality tests, we collapse Iid to the firm level and obtain Ii.
Secondly, as outcomes are reported on different scales for different variables we adapt
estimators accordingly. “Low Wage”, and “Dismissal” are continuous variables, sug-
gesting OLS estimation, for “Low Wages” we additionally estimate a Poisson model
to account for the large number of observations at or close to zero. Both employee
benefits “Pension Scheme” and “Extended Leave” as well as the indicator whether the
firm pays any benefits (“Any Benefit”) are binary outcomes, implying probit regres-
sions. The same applies to the variables “Job Security”, “General Training”, and “Firm
Performance”. Finally “Team-working”, “On-the-Job Training”, “No. Benefits”, and
“Monitoring” are provided on an ordinal scale which leads us to use an ordered probit
estimation approach.
The first set of controls, Iid, comprises competency tests and a compound mea-
sure, whether employees (i.e. non-managers) either receive performance payments or
profit payments. We define this measure as “Incentive Pay”. These two variables can
(along with personality tests) be regarded as indicators for somewhat sophisticated
HRM practises, which itself may be correlated with all outcome variables we observe.
higher number of observations) and different sized firms may at the same time be differently
likely to provide their employees job security, we include the number of occupational groups per
establishment into the set of controls. By this procedure we aim to reduce the likelihood that this
effect may confound the results.
29The results are robust to the inclusion of managers. However, as the focus of this study is on
reciprocal behaviour of employees, we exclude managers, who traditionally stand between the
workforce and the owner of the company and hence may have different incentives.
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Controlling for them, we attempt to mitigate the problem of omitted variables.
Firm fixed controls are summarised in Xi, containing dummies for all nine possible
occupational groups in a firm. We include these dummies whenever running regressions
on occupational group level. In all regressions, we control for whether a firm belongs to
a foreign organisation or is unionised. Furthermore we control for detailed recruiting
practises and account for region, industry, size of the establishment, and use a dummy
which indicates whether the establishment belongs to the public sector. As explained
in Footnote 28, estimating the effect of personality tests on “Job Security” includes the
number of occupational groups into firm-level controls.
Table 2: Benefits for the Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Poisson O. Probit Probit Probit
Bottom Wage Bottom Wage Training Gen. Training Job Security
Pers. Test −0.051∗∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.22
(0.014) (0.55) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14)
Comp. Test −0.012 −0.075 0.087 0.038 0.11
(0.012) (0.27) (0.088) (0.11) (0.099)
Inc. Pay −0.0059 0.025 0.14 0.13 0.042
(0.014) (0.25) (0.097) (0.12) (0.12)
Foreign −0.012 −2.01 0.29 −0.29 −0.56
(0.022) (1.32) (0.28) (0.39) (0.42)
PubSector −0.043∗∗∗ −1.49∗∗ 0.13 0.18 0.38∗∗
(0.014) (0.66) (0.15) (0.21) (0.18)
Union −0.034∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗ 0.0061 −0.052 0.49∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.36) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2104 2104 1888 1964 7892
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS and Poisson regressions of
the fraction of workers with income less than 4.5 pounds/hour (columns (1) and (2)) as well as of
(ordered) Probit regressions of provision of “Training” (column (3)), “General Training” (column (4)),
and “Job Security” (column(5)), on dummy variables personality tests, competency tests, and on
controls. Regressions in the first two columns provide results on firm level, and estimates for column
(3) and (4) report estimates for the largest occupational group. Column (5) provides estimates for
each occupational group and includes an additional dummy to control for the number of occupational
groups per firm.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.3. Results
Table 2 and Table 3 summarise estimation results on Hypothesis 1, which we previously
defined as necessary conditions in order to induce reciprocal behaviour of employees.
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We interpret personality tests as a proxy for whether employers search for potentially
reciprocal workers. If they do so we should observe patterns associated with gift-
exchange motivation.
Table 2 column (1) provides evidence that personality tests are significantly and
negatively related to the share of employees receiving very low wages of 4.5 pounds
per hour or less. Note also, that this is true for personality tests, but not for the
other two proxies that we employ to capture sophisticated HRM practises, competency
tests and variable payments.30 In order to substantiate the finding that firms using
personality tests have fewer low wage earners, we amend our analysis and in column
(2) also show results for a regression assuming a Poisson distribution – accounting for
the large probability mass at and near zero – which confirms our findings from the OLS
model.31
Firms which screen their job candidates for personality also offer significantly more
days of on-the-job training per year (column (3)) and are more likely to train their
employees with general skills which are beneficial for their future working life (column
(4)).32 Similarly to low wages, neither competency tests nor incentive payments predict
the amount of on-the-job training. The same applies to the matters that the training
covers: the coefficient on competency test for instance is ten times smaller than the
estimate of personality tests.
Finally, there seems to be a weak tendency for firms with obligatory personality
tests to provide more job security, as shown in column (5). However, for our main
specification this relationship is not significantly different from zero at any common
level. However, in Section 3.4 we repeat our analysis with varying sets of human
resource controls and find persistent and significant correlations of job security with
personality tests.33
30In principle, models of reciprocal motivation deliver relatively precise predictions on the optimal
level and structure of wages. Unfortunately, the WERS has rather coarse information on these
variables. In future work it would be highly desirable to be able to assess these predictions with
more detailed data on wage levels and structures and at the same time on the composition of the
workforce (to control for skill related compositional changes of the workforce in firms that use
personality tests).
31In contrast, in unreported regressions we do not find significant evidence that personality tests can
explain the relative share of employees who earn top wages.
32In Table B-2 we provide estimates for alternative definitions of our “General Training” variable: (1)
we define “General Training” if the employee receives at least one of the following three trainings:
Teamworking, Communicational Skills, or Leadership Skills; (2) includes Problem-Solving Skills;
(3) includes in addition to (2) training on Reliability and Working towards Deadlines; (4) adds
Quality Control Processes to (3); (5) uses Teamworking, Leadership Skills and Problem-Solving
Methods to define “General Training”. The results are robust to using either of these definitions.
33Note that for job security we have information on its provision across all occupational groups.
Hence, Column (5) of Table 2 presents results of a regression where we use information on all
occupational groups within a firm while we control for firm fixed effects; thus the substantially
higher number of observations. I.e., we compare occupational groups with and without personality
tests w.r.t. the incidence of job security provision.
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Table 3: Non-Pecuniary Benefits for the Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit O. Probit Probit Probit
Benefits No. Benefits Pension Extended Paid Leave
Pers. Test 0.36∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.20) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16)
Comp. Test 0.059 0.083 0.24∗∗ 0.13
(0.13) (0.078) (0.11) (0.11)
Inc. Pay 0.31∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.083) (0.11) (0.11)
Foreign −0.35 0.0073 0.0029 −0.22
(0.35) (0.32) (0.39) (0.35)
Union 0.48∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.094) (0.14) (0.14)
PubSector 1.32∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.14) (0.26) (0.20)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of (ordered) Probit regressions of
provision of “Benefits” (column (1)), provision of employer “Pension” scheme (column (3)), “Extended
Paid Level” (column(4)) and ordered Probit regressions of the “No. Benefits” (column (2)) on
personality tests, competency tests, and on controls. All regressions provide estimates for the largest
occupational group.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3 exploits information about non-pay terms and conditions in more detail.
In column (1) we find personality tests being associated with the likelihood that at
least one of five suggested benefits is provided by the employer. The intuition for this
measure is that firms providing reciprocal incentives may face different costs for each
of the listed benefits. Hence in order to make use of reciprocity most cost efficiently,
different benefits may be chosen.
The next column provides evidence for a positive relation between personality tests
and how many of five different benefits employees within a firm enjoy; this confirms the
results from the first column. Finally, we analyse two non-pay terms of employment:
the presence of an employer pension scheme and the provision of more than four weeks
annual paid leave are strongly and positively correlated with the use of personality
tests.34
These benefits are not only strongly associated with personality tests but similarly
34We report estimation results only for two out of five potential non-pay terms of employment. The
omitted terms of employment show systematically positive, though insignificant, correlations with
personality tests. Estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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closely related to variable payments. Note, however, that competency tests only poorly
predict the provision of these benefits. Only for employer pension schemes (column (3))
we find significant correlations for competency tests, confirming our assumption that
personality tests and competency tests are not substitutes.
Result 1 (Generosity to Workers) Firms which screen for job candidates’ person-
ality are less likely to pay very low wages and provide more on-the-job training that is
more general. Furthermore, employees in firms with personality tests are more likely to
receive non-monetary benefits, especially employer pension schemes as well as extended
paid leave. Such employees receive a higher number of non-pay benefits overall.
Table 4: Benefits for the Employer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
O. Probit O. Probit OLS Probit
Teamworking Monitoring Dismissal Performance
Pers. Test 0.43∗∗∗ 0.081 0.0045 0.26∗
(0.15) (0.10) (0.0059) (0.14)
Comp. Test 0.17∗ −0.035 −0.00075 −0.089
(0.095) (0.083) (0.0041) (0.099)
Inc. Pay 0.039 0.067 0.0076∗ 0.19∗
(0.092) (0.089) (0.0043) (0.11)
Foreign −0.20 −0.39 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.25) (0.29) (0.0060) (0.36)
Union −0.032 −0.00094 −0.0087∗∗ −0.15
(0.12) (0.12) (0.0036) (0.12)
PubSector 0.23 0.048 −0.0065∗ −0.058
(0.18) (0.16) (0.0038) (0.19)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2268 2279 2149 2147
R2 0.075
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered Probit regressions of the
degree of “Team-working” (column (1)), and “Monitoring” (column (2)), OLS regressions of the
relative share of the variable “Dismissal” within one year in column (3) and Probit regressions of firm
“Performance” (column (4)) on personality tests, competency tests, and on controls. Regression in
the column (1) is based on the largest occupational group and column (2) – (4) provide results on
firm level.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Rational employers provide gifts only if they expect to profit from this strategy.
Hence the second set of hypotheses is concerned with benefits for the employers’ side.
Table 4 summarises potential benefits for the employer. Column (1) reports the
correlation between personality tests and team-working, which is highly significant.
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Competency tests are associated with team-working as well, but comparing the mag-
nitudes of the coefficients, it becomes clear that personality tests are associated with
higher levels of team-working. Furthermore it is important to notice that incentive pay
is uncorrelated with the the fraction of employees that are designated to teams.
The second two hypotheses are borrowed from Huang and Cappelli (2010). Contrary
to their results, however, we do not find any relation between personality tests (or
any other HRM practise) and monitoring.35 At first glance this is counterintuitive,
as it seems to contradict reciprocity as underlying story of our results. However,
this may be a result of the design of the question in the WERS, as it asks for the
fraction of “non-managerial employees [who] have job duties involving supervising other
employees” whereas Huang and Cappelli (2010) estimate the employee-supervisor ratio.
Hence, in our data personality tests may reduce (unobserved) payrolls for employees
who exclusively monitor as reciprocal employees control each other and do not collude
against the employer. This implies that results may differ, as variables measure different
dimensions of monitoring.
Second, there seems not to be a strong relation between relative dismissals and any
of the suggested HRM practises including personality tests. The absence of such a
relation, however, questions the argument that firms use personality tests primarily to
ensure an employee’s “fit” to a company rather than also identifying specific desirable
traits, like social preferences and reciprocity. If ensuring fit was the primary concern,
we would expect to see fewer dismissals in firms that use personality tests. Thus we
conjecture that personality tests are not merely used to improve general fit but may
also be devices to screen for social preferences.
One potential concern is the limited variation in firms reporting dismissals. To
address this we consider an alternate measure of employee turnover which includes
employees who left or resigned voluntarily, which would include workers leaving to
preempt dismissal. Once these cases are included, 15 percent of firms report turnover
within the last year. However, this does not change our conclusion that personality
tests are unrelated to turnover.
Finally, column (4) provides evidence that firms using personality tests seem to
perform better, at least according to self-rated performance measures. Similarly to
previous results, competency tests have no explanatory power, whereas incentive pay
predicts success comparably well.
Result 2 (Value to Firms) Firms which screen for job candidates’ personalities des-
ignate more employees to work in teams and report to be more successful on the market.
35Huang and Cappelli (2010) argue, plausibly, that being able to reduce the intensity of monitoring
is beneficial for firms as it safes on costs.
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In Appendix D we present evidence that the use of personality tests for hiring pur-
poses is also highly related to various compound measures of firm benefits – pooling
potential benefits like more team-working, less monitoring, better market performance
and less dismissals in a second specification.
3.4. Robustness
By providing robustness tests for the previous results, this section also offers an exten-
sive discussion of our results so far. A first obvious plausibility check is to see whether
the use of personality tests in one occupational group relates to benefits for employees
in another occupational group for which personality test are not used. We would expect
that, if the effect is causal, the estimated coefficients are smaller in occupational groups
in the same firms for which personality test are not used. Unfortunately, this check can
only be performed for job security, the only item where we have information across all
occupational groups within a firm.36 To do so we include a dummy for occupational
groups who have no personality test but belong to a firm that does use personality
tests for other occupational groups. Inspecting the respective results in Table A-1 in
Appendix A document that the coefficient for this dummy is in fact significantly lower
than the coefficient for personality test.
We are aware that drawing causal inferences is not valid as we cannot argue that
personality tests were randomly assigned to firms. However, we go to great lengths to
control for the general sophistication of a firm’s human resource department. Modern
human resource devices like personality tests or competency tests are likely to be
correlated with (unobservable) other dimensions of quality of management practises
which itself may be related to suggested benefits as well. Without being able to entirely
exclude this mechanism, we aim to address that shortcoming by applying different sets
of HRM practises as control variables.
We suggest five sets of HRM practises to include in the vector Iid. Set 1 only
includes whether the respective firm requires competency tests upon hiring and neglects
incentive payments. Thus the indicator vector Ii only varies across firms, not within
firms. The second set, Set 2, additionally includes whether the firm asks for personality
tests for managers.37 Set 3 additionally includes incentive payments. For the last
two human resource sets we construct indicators reflecting potential complementarities
between these measures: In Set 4 the indicator for sophisticated HRM practises is
equal to one if at least one of three, competency tests, personality tests for managers
or incentive pay, is present at the respective firm. This measure has the least strict
36We are grateful to two referees for suggesting this robustness check to us.
37Remember that managers are excluded in the entire analysis in order to avoid confounding results,
as managers’ job profiles involve both principal and agent duties.
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requirements for a firm to be classified as using sophisticated HRM practices. In
contrast to that, Set 5 requires firms to use all of the previously listed devices, implying
it to be the strictest criterion for a classification in to the sophisticated HRM-use
category.
The online appendix contains robustness tables with coefficients and standard errors
for personality tests, competency tests, and for the two presented compound measures
of HR sophistication for each dependent variable and for each set of human resource
controls. Note that even though not all coefficients of interest are significant at the
highest level, the very systematic pattern of correlations emerging across a large set of
specifications lends our core results substantial support. Table C-1 to Table C-5 refer
to the table “Benefits for the Employee”. “Low Wages” are summarised in Table C-1
and Table C-2. “Low Wage” is related to personality tests for each set of controls.
We observe similar behaviour of personality tests on employee benefits. Personality
tests are significantly associated with “On-the-job Training” in three of five control
sets (Table C-3) and screening for personality of non-managers is significant in all
regressions on “General Training” except when we explicitly include personality tests
for managers (Table C-4).
In Table 2, “Job Security” is positively though insignificantly related to personality
tests. Regarding Table C-5 we find significant associations in four of five specifications.
With weak evidence from our main regressions, we conclude to only provide some
tentative evidence in favour of higher job security in establishments with personality
tests.
The next set of tables, Table C-6 to Table C-9 relate to dependent variables in Table
3. Common to all four tables is that in specification 1, 4 and 5 coefficients change to only
minor degrees and standard errors are comparable. Control sets 2 and 3 on the contrary
depict smaller impacts of personality tests on dependent variables which in most cases
– with the exception of employer pension scheme – lead to insignificant coefficients
of personality tests. However, explicitly including personality test for managers (the
decisive criterion of Set 2 and Set 3) into our analysis of whether personality tests
influence suggested benefits changes the situation: Performing an adjusted Wald test
for joint significance of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-
managers provides evidence for joint importance of personality tests. Personality tests
for managers and non-managers are jointly significant at the ten percent level in Set
2 for “Benefit” (Table C-6). Both tests are jointly significant for both sets for “No.
Benefits” on a one percent level, as can be seen in Table C-7. Finally, both tests are
jointly significant for “Pension Scheme” and “Extended Paid Leave” on a five percent
level, as reported in Table C-8 and Table C-9.38
38Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Finally, Table C-10 to Table C-13 provide a closer look on all six regressions in Table
4, which summarises benefits for the employer. The correlation between personality
tests of non-managers and team-working (Table C-10) is stable and significant across
all five specifications of HRM practises. Even with different sets of controls, hypotheses
on less monitoring (Table C-11) and reduced dismissals (Table C-12) are unrelated to
personality tests of non-managers. This is also true for joint significance for manager
and non-manger screening of the establishment. These negative results on dismissals
across all control sets provides further evidence that personality tests are not (only)
applied to improve the “fit” between applicant and firm.
Summarising, Result 1 is robust to specifications 1, 4 and 5, but seems less robust
regarding specifications 2 and 3, i.e. when personality tests for managers are explicitly
included to the controls. However, conditional on using personality tests at all, many
firms choose to use personality tests for both managers and non-managers, hence both
measures are highly correlated resulting in imprecise point estimates. For this reason
we report adjusted Wald tests, which are by and large in line with the main regressions.
Robustness tests for Result 2 do not systematically deviate from findings in the main
section, suggesting that the association between personality tests and firm benefits
seems to be profound.
4. Conclusion
A large and growing body of recent research in personnel economics relates the social
preferences of employees to firm behaviour. Accounting for employees’ (social) prefer-
ences may alter organisational structure within the firm and can lead to different job
characteristics; see, e.g., Bartling et al. (2012).
In this paper we use the 2004 wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS 2004) and find that firms behave consistent with a model of gift-exchange
based motivation for their employees if they screen job candidates for personality. We
use personality tests as a proxy for the degree of reciprocity (susceptibility to gift-
exchange) within the workforce. Previous research has documented that traits elicited
in personality tests are correlated with (laboratory) concepts of reciprocity.
Firms which apply personality tests are more likely to provide their employees (non-
pecuniary) benefits such as employer pension schemes or extended paid annual leave.
These employers are furthermore less likely to pay very low wages and provide more
on-the-job training to their employees. On-the-job training is more frequent, and more
general in content, rather than workplace related, implying a higher added value for
workers. Finally, there is a weak tendency for firms with personality tests to provide
their employees protection against redundancies via job security. On the other hand,
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firms also benefit from screening for personality: we find that these firms are generally
more successful (in terms of profits, productivity and/or quality) and are more likely
to be able to employ team-working. Importantly, competency tests upon hiring and
incentive pay predict only poorly (if at all) benefits both for the firm as well as for
employees. This indicates that the use of sophisticated HRM practises is not sufficient
to explain the provision of benefits and firm performance. It is necessary that firms
explicitly screen for job candidates’ personality.
By and large, our analysis confirms the results of Huang and Cappelli (2010). Us-
ing US survey data, they proxy for the importance of job candidates’ “work ethic” for
employers’ hiring decisions and find that firms which put high weight on “work ethic”
on average pay higher wages, have more team-working and are more productive. Our
results only deviate in two dimensions: First, we do not find stable relationships be-
tween screening and monitoring – however this could be caused by different defintions
of monitoring. Second, our measure of turnover – dismissals relative to firm size – is
unrelated to personality tests. The latter (negative) result indicates that personality
tests are not primarily a device to improve the fit between applicant and firm. Together
with poor predictive power of other HRM practises, gift-exchange motives in firms with
personality tests appear to have additional explanatory power for our findings.
In terms of future research we believe two avenues to be particularly fruitful. First,
to the extent that the wage setting and benefit provision policies of firms are known to
applicants, one would expect self-selection of workers into firms. Hence the analysis of
the complementary use of hiring policies to attract the right talent, and the provision
of incentives and benefits designed to motivate, develop, and retain this talent appears
to be important.39 Second, as stated in the introduction, incentive provision via career
concerns and relational contracts is an important aspect of incentives in labour mar-
kets. Studying the interaction of dynamic incentives and reciprocity based incentives
is certainly an important field of future study.40
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A. Robustness Analysis: Personality Tests in other
Occupational Groups
Table A-1: Robustness: Personality Tests in other Occupational Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Poisson O. Probit Probit Probit
Bottom Wage Bottom Wage Training Gen. Training Job Security
Pers. Test −0.051∗∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.19
(0.014) (0.55) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15)
Comp. Test −0.012 −0.075 0.087 0.038 0.13
(0.012) (0.27) (0.088) (0.11) (0.100)
Inc. Pay −0.0059 0.025 0.14 0.13 0.047
(0.014) (0.25) (0.097) (0.12) (0.12)
Foreign −0.012 −2.01 0.29 −0.29 −0.57
(0.022) (1.32) (0.28) (0.39) (0.42)
Pub. Sector −0.043∗∗∗ −1.49∗∗ 0.13 0.18 0.38∗∗
(0.014) (0.66) (0.15) (0.21) (0.18)
Union −0.034∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗ 0.0061 −0.052 0.49∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.36) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
Pers. Test (other) −0.27∗
(0.15)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2104 2104 1888 1964 7892
Adj. Wald Test
(1) Pers. Test = 0
(2) Pers. Test (other) = 0
F(2, 2185) 4.11
Prob > F 0.0165
Notes: This table reproduces Table 2 but includes the dummy variable “Pers. Test (other)” in column
(5). This dummy is 1, if no personality tests are conducted in the occupational group at hand and
at the same time in at least one other occupational group within the same firm personality tests are
performed and 0 otherwise.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B. Robustness Analysis: Definition of General
Training
Table B-2: Robustness: Variable Definitions of General Training
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Base Regression Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
Pers. Test 0.34∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.31∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.16)
Comp. Test 0.038 0.094 0.075 0.046 0.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Inc. Pay 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.28∗∗ 0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Foreign −0.29 −0.36 −0.35 −0.20 −0.29
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Union −0.052 −0.076 −0.12 −0.063 0.020
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
PubSector 0.18 0.14 0.091 −0.025 0.057
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20)
Constant −0.37 −0.42 −0.33 −0.29 −0.71∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.40)
Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions for different
specifications of the variable “General Training”. Column (1) shows the base regression from
Table 2 where we define “General Training” if the employee receives at least one of the following
three trainings: Teamworking, Communicational Skills, or Leadership Skills. Column (2) includes
Problem-Solving Skills, column (3) includes (in addition to column (2)) training on Reliability and
Working towards Deadlines. Column (4) adds Quality Control Processes to column (3) and column
(5) uses Teamworking, Leadership Skills and Problem-Solving Methods to define “General Training”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C. Robustness Analysis: Differing Set of Controls
The following tables provide estimates for five different sets of human resource controls:
Set 1 only includes a dummy variable indicating whether the respective firm uses
competency tests. On top of that, Set 2 controls for personality tests of managers,
whereas Set 3 additionally includes incentive payments. Set 4 and Set 5 are compound
measures for the presence of HRM practises: The dummy in Set 4 equals one if either
the firm uses competency tests or personality tests for managers or incentive pay. The
indicator in Set 5 is one if all suggested measures, competency tests, personality tests
for managers and incentive pay are present at the firm.
Other firm related controls are unchanged: In all regressions, we control for whether
a firm belongs to a foreign organisation or is unionised. Furthermore we control for
region, industry, size of the establishment, and use a dummy which indicates whether
the establishment belongs to the public sector.
i
Table C-1: Robustness: Low Wage – OLS
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test −0.052∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2138) 7.46 7.21
Prob > F 0.001 0.001
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the share of
employees earning low wages (below 4.5 pounds per hour) on personality tests and five different sets
of controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the
firm level. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality
tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-2: Robustness: Low Wage – Poisson
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test −1.44∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗ −1.36∗∗ −1.41∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.59) (0.59) (0.54) (0.56)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2100 2100 2100 2103 2103
Adj. Wald Test
(1) Pers. Test = 0
(2) Groups Dummy = 0 F(2, 2185) 4.11
Prob > F 0.0165
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Poisson regressions of the share of
employees earning low wages (below 4.5 pounds per hour) on personality tests and five different sets
of controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the
firm level. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality
tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-3: Robustness: Training
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.26∗ 0.25 0.25 0.25∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2126) 1.95 1.90
Prob > F 0.14 0.15
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered Probit regressions of how
many days employees are trained during one year on personality tests and five different sets of
controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the
analysis of the largest occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that
the coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-4: Robustness: General Training
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.34∗ 0.23 0.23 0.32∗ 0.32∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2124) 3.36 3.22
Prob > F 0.04 0.04
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions of the provision
of general training on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on the
control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest occupational
group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests
for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-5: Robustness: Job Security
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.28 0.33∗ 0.34∗ 0.32∗ 0.34∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 6982 6982 6982 6982 6982
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2165) 1.43 1.51
Prob > F 0.24 0.22
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions of the provision
of job security on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on the
control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of all occupational group and
includes a control for the number of occupational groups per firm. The adjusted Wald test refers to
the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality tests for
non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-6: Robustness: Benefits
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.37∗ 0.29 0.28 0.34∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 2.53 2.23
Prob > F 0.08 0.11
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions of the provision of
benefits for the employees on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on
the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest occupational
group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests
for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-7: Robustness: No. of Benefits
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.30∗∗∗ 0.21 0.21 0.28∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 5.30 5.22
Prob > F 0.01 0.01
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered Probit regressions of the
number of provided benefits for the employees on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the analysis
of the largest occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the
coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-8: Robustness: Employer Pension Scheme
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 3.47 3.44
Prob > F 0.03 0.03
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions of whether
employer offer pension schemes on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further
details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest
occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of
personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-9: Robustness: Extended Paid Leave
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.38∗∗ 0.28 0.27 0.35∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 3.54 3.09
Prob > F 0.03 0.05
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions of whether
employer offer extended paid leave on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further
details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest
occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of
personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-10: Robustness: Team-Working
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.43∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 4.39 4.33
Prob > F 0.01 0.01
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered Probit regressions of what
share of employees is designated to teams on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For
further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the analysis of the
largest occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient
of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-11: Robustness: Monitoring
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.086 0.11 0.10 0.081 0.082
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2279 2279 2279 2282 2282
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2153) 0.39 0.36
Prob > F 0.68 0.70
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered Probit regressions of the
share of employees who have monitoring tasks on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the firm level.
The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for
managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-12: Robustness: Dismissals
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.0051 0.0024 0.0020 0.0039 0.0041
(0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0062)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2149 2149 2149 2152 2152
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2072) 0.67 0.54
Prob > F 0.51 0.58
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the share of
employees who have been dismissed during the previous year on personality tests and five different
sets of controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on
the firm level. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality
tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C-13: Robustness: Firm Performance
Control Sets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pers. Test 0.28∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.31∗ 0.26∗ 0.23
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15)






Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2147 2147 2147 2148 2148
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2192) 1.98 1.79
Prob > F 0.14 0.17
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions of self-reported
measure of firm performance being one if either managers report higher than median financial
performance of their own firm, or higher than median labour productivity or higher than median
product quality on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on the
control sets, see Appendix B. All regressions are based on the firm level. The adjusted Wald test
refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality
tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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D. Compound Measure for Firm Benefits
We construct the variable “Benefit 1” as a comprehensive measure of success of estab-
lishments. It either relates to self-reported outcomes or to the ability of the firm to
employ (highly) desirable work practices: The measure takes the value one if the respec-
tive firm either reports higher than median firm performance, uses more team-working
than the median firm, or relies less on monitoring (compared to the median).
We also use an alternative indicator for overall firm benefits, “Benefit 2” which in-
cludes dismissals and reports high benefits if additionally the firm has dismissals lower
or equal to median dismissals. The purpose of this procedure is to fully address all
firm benefits – monitoring, team-working, dismissals, and productivity – which were
suggested by Huang and Cappelli (2010) in one compound measure. However this pro-
cedure comes at a price: By doing so, we lose much of the variation as most firms do
not have any dismissals within the previous year, c.f. Table (1), resulting in almost 90
percent of firms being classified as firms which reap some suggested benefits.
Variant B, for both compound measures, gives an alternative measure for “Firm
Performance”. Instead of including financial performance, labour productivity and
superior product quality, “Firm Performance” in Variant B only then indicates better
than market performance if the respective firm reports higher than median financial
performance or labour productivity.
Table D-14 shows that both measures, “Benefit 1” and “Benefit 2”, are strongly
correlated with Personality Tests. This is true regardless of the assumed definition of
“Firm Performance”, i.e. for Variant B as well. It is most striking that only personality
tests but not competency tests can predict, whether firms are profiting in at least one
of the suggested dimensions.
xv
Table D-14: Robustness: Firm Benefits – Compound Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Benefit 1 Benefit 2
Variant B Variant B
Pers. Test 0.51∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.28∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Comp. Test 0.076 0.11 0.0012 −0.0047
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)
Inc. Pay 0.083 0.080 −0.18 −0.17
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15)
Foreign 0.33 0.39 0.18 0.21
(0.33) (0.34) (0.37) (0.37)
Union −0.17 −0.19 0.100 0.055
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
PubSector 0.22 0.18 −0.31 −0.19
(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2279 2279 2279 2279
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions for different
compound measures on firm benefits on Personality Tests, further HR practises and controls. The
dependent variable in column (1) is 1 if the respective firm uses less monitoring than the median
firm, or uses more teamworking than the median, or reports higher than median values for financial
performance, labour productivity or product quality. The definition of the dependent variable in
column (2) equals the definition in (1) excluding product quality as criterion. The indicator in
column (3) uses the same definition as column (1) and additionally defines the dependent variable as
success if the respective firm records zero dismissals within the previous year. The definition of the
dependent variable in column (4) equals the definition in (3) excluding product quality as criterion.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
E. Robustness Analysis: Alternative Definition of
the Use of Personality Tests
This table summarises outcome variables that are reported on the firm level. In contrast
to previous regressions we define personality tests (competency tests/incentive pay) to
be present if these measures are introduced in the largest occupational group instead
of demanding the introduction of these measures in any occupational group.
As the results show, results are qualitatively not affected by this alternative defini-
tion.
xvi
Table E-15: Robustness: Alternative Definition of Personality/Competency Tests and
Incentive Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Poisson O. Probit OLS Probit
Low Wage Low Wage Monitoring Dismissal Performance
Pers. Test −0.059∗∗∗ −1.50∗∗ 0.037 0.0060 0.27∗
(0.016) (0.59) (0.11) (0.0065) (0.15)
Comp. Test −0.0062 −0.091 −0.037 −0.000029 −0.061
(0.013) (0.30) (0.087) (0.0041) (0.10)
Inc. Pay 0.0043 0.16 0.099 0.0080∗ 0.20∗
(0.015) (0.25) (0.092) (0.0047) (0.11)
Foreign −0.014 −1.99 −0.40 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.023) (1.31) (0.30) (0.0060) (0.37)
Union −0.035∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗ 0.0099 −0.0091∗∗ −0.16
(0.011) (0.37) (0.12) (0.0036) (0.12)
PubSector −0.043∗∗∗ −1.47∗∗ 0.053 −0.0067∗ −0.064
(0.013) (0.67) (0.16) (0.0039) (0.19)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2105 2105 2284 2154 2149
Notes: This table summarises outcome variables that are reported on firm level. We define personality
tests (competency tests/incentive pay) to be present if these measures are introduced in the largest
occupational group instead of demanding the introduction of these measures in any occupational
group. We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS and Poisson regressions of
the fraction of workers with income less than 4.5 pounds/hour (columns (1) and (2)) as well as of
ordered Probit regressions of provision of “Monitoring” (column (3)), OLS regression of “Dismissal”
(column (4)), and Probit regression of “Performance” (column(5)), on dummy variables personality
tests, competency tests, and on controls.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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